How to do things without words

Clark and Chalmers (1998) defend the hypothesis of an ‘Extended Mind’, maintaining that beliefs and other paradigmatic mental states can be implemented outside the central nervous system or body. Aspects of the problem of ‘language acquisition’ are considered in the light of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather than ‘language’ as typically understood, the object of study is something called ‘utterance-activity’, a term of art intended to refer to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of interacting humans. It is argued that utterance activity is plausibly regarded as jointly controlled by the embodied activity of interacting people, and that it contributes to the control of their behaviour. By means of specific examples it is suggested that this complex joint control facilitates easier learning of at least some features of language. This in turn suggests a striking form of the extended mind, in which infants’ cognitive powers are augmented by those of the people with whom they interact

Predictors of Peri-Operative Risk Acceptance by South African Vascular Surgery Patients at a Tertiary Level Hospital

Background: Vascular surgical patients have an elevated cardiac risk following non-cardiac surgery. The decision whether to proceed with surgery is multidimensional. Patients must balance the considerations in favour of surgery with those favouring conservative treatment, which requires weighing peri-operative risk against morbidity associated with non-surgical treatment.Methods: The aim of this prospective correlational study was to determine the proportional contributions of (i) pain, (ii) impulsivity, (iii) patients’ perception of the benefits of surgery, (iv) patients’ perception of peri-operative risk and (v) the predicted peri-operative risk on acceptance of peri-operative risk by vascular surgical patients. Sixty patients were prospectively recruited by convenience sampling from the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital vascular surgery clinic between April 2014 and June 2014. Written informed consent was obtained. Patients completed a questionnaire which documented demographics, pain assessment, impulsivity screen (Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11), patients’ perception of surgery, predicted peri-operative risk (South African Vascular Surgical Cardiac Risk Index) and acceptance of peri-operative risk. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics and linear regression (SPSS version 22).Results: The patients’ perception of the benefits of surgery (β 0.36, 95% CI 0.14–0.70, p = 0.005) was the only predictor of peri-operative risk acceptance. The associations between the other potential predictors and the outcome were insignificant.Conclusion: The perceived benefit of surgery was the most important predictor of acceptance of peri-operative risk in this cohort.Keywords: Pain, Peri-operative Risk, Shared Decision-making, Vascular Surger

The hypothetical consent objection to anti-natalism

Abstract: A very common but untested assumption is that potential children would consent to be exposed to the harms of existence in order to experience its benefits (if it were possible for us to ask and for them to respond). And so, would-be parents might appeal to the following view: Procreation is all-things-considered permissible, as it is morally acceptable for one to knowingly harm an unconsenting patient if one has good reasons for assuming her hypothetical consent—and procreators can indeed reasonably rely on some notion of hypothetical consent. I argue that this view is in error. My argument appeals to a consent-based version of anti-natalism advanced by Seana Valentine Shiffrin. Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. While, like Shiffrin, I stop short of advocating a thoroughgoing anti-natalism, I nevertheless argue that procreators cannot appeal to hypothetical consent to justify exposing children to the harms of existence. I end by suggesting a more promising route by which this justification might be achieved

On Component Forces in Physics: A Pragmatic View

Do component forces exist? I argue that the answer lies in the affirmative, on historical and operational grounds

CSR and related terms in SME owner-managers' mental models in six European countries: national context matters

As a contribution to the emerging field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) cognition, this article reports on the findings of an exploratory study that compares SME owner–managers’ mental models with regard to CSR and related concepts across six European countries (Belgium, Italy, Norway, France, UK, Spain). Utilising Repertory Grid Technique, we found that the SME owner–managers’ mental models show a few commonalities as well as a number of differences across the different country samples. We interpret those differences by linking individual cognition to macro-environmental variables, such as language, national traditions and dissemination mechanisms. The results of our exploratory study show that nationality matters but that classifications of countries as found in the comparative capitalism literature do not exactly mirror national differences in CSR cognition and that these classifications need further differentiation. The findings from our study raise questions on the universality of cognition of academic management concepts and warn that promotion of responsible business practice should not rely on the use of unmediated US American management terminology

Need there be a common currency for decision-making?

According to various theorists and empirical scholars of behavior and decision,including economists, utility theorists, behavioral ecologists, behavioraleconomists and researchers in the new field of neuroeconomics the value(typically understood as utility) of competing choices must be represented ona common scale in order for them to count as competing at all, and in orderfor orderly comparison to lead to actual choices. For some neuroeconomiststhis means that expected (cardinal) utilities are neurally represented by firingrates of cells in specific brain regions. In this paper some important statements of the ‘common currency’ argument are reviewed and critically examined. A rational reconstruction of the key argument is then subject to criticism informed by a variety of empirical and theoretical considerations. In astrong form it does not survive the criticism, and this fact points the way to are-examination of the sense in which complex living systems, includingpeople, are agents in any straightforward sense

Review of Burns, J. The Descent of Madness: Evolutionary Origins of Psychosis and the Social Brain

Review of Burns, J. The Descent of Madness: Evolutionary Origins of Psychosis and the Social Brain(London: Routledge, 2007

Why ‘Appeals to Intuitions’ might not be so bad

There has been lively recent debate over the value of appeals to intuitions in philosophy. Some, especially ‘experimental philosophers’, have argued that such appeals can carry little or no evidential weight, and that standard analytic philosophy is consequently methodologically bankrupt. Variousdefences of intuitions, and analytic philosophy, have also been offered. In this paper I review the case against intuitions, in particular the claims that intuitions vary with culture, and are built by natural selection, and argue that much of their force depends on assuming that the required sense of intuition is of a kind of human universal. In opposition to this view I argue that there is reason to regard intuitions of professional philosophers as parochial developmental achievements (so that cultural variation among non-professionals is irrelevant) and also the product of a training process that warrants ascribing some evidential weight to them. The argument made here is not anti-naturalistic, nor does it grant intuitions any special or trumping evidential status. Unlike some defences of analytic philosophy it does not depend on denying that philosophers appeal to intuitions at all

Hooray for babies

David Benatar has argued that the coming into existence of a sentient being is always a harm, and consequently that people who have children always do wrong. The most natural objection maintains that in many lives (at least) while there is some pain, there are also goods (including pleasures) that can outweigh the suffering. From Benatar’s perspective this move, while possibly useful in assessing the lives of those who actually exist, is not an effective defence of procreation. In the case of people who do not yet exist, he maintains that there is a crucial asymmetry arising from the putative fact that the absence of pain is good even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom that absence is a deprivation. For the potentially existing, he concludes, preventing the pain of existence is justified, but not so facilitating enjoyment of its pleasures. I argue that the asymmetry is insufficiently motivated. I also sketch two additional lines of argument against the asymmetry. First, it may not include all relevant factors. Second, plausible duties to prevent pain require possible sufferers, but do not apply straightforwardly when extended to include preventing the sufferers themselves

Putting apes, (body and language) together again

Original article can be found at: http://www.sciencedirect.com Copyright Elsevier Limited [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]It is argued that the account of Savage-Rumbaugh's ape language research in Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker and Taylor (1998. Apes, Language and the Human Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford) is profitably read in the terms of the theoretical perspective developed in Clark (1997. Being There, Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA). The former work details some striking results concerning chimpanzee and bonobo subjects, trained to make use of keyboards containing ‘lexigram’ symbols. The authors, though, make heavy going of a critique of what they take to be standard approaches to understanding language and cognition in animals, and fail to offer a worthwhile theoretical position from which to make sense of their own data. It is suggested that the achievements of Savage-Rumbaugh's non-human subjects suggest that language ability need not be explained by reference to specialised brain capacities. The contribution made by Clark's work is to show the range of ways in which cognition exploits bodily and environmental resources. This model of ‘distributed’ cognition helps makes sense of the lexigram activity of Savage-Rumbaugh's subjects, and points to a re-evaluation of the language behaviour of humans.Peer reviewe